

A  
L E T T E R  
TO THE  
V O L U N T E E R S,  
UPON THE  
S U B J E C T  
OF A  
Parliamentary Reform.

By ANDREW DORIA.

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“ Though we have preserved the armour, we have lost the  
“ Spirit of our Constitution, and therefore we bear from  
“ little engrossers of delegated Power, what our Fathers  
“ would not have suffered from true Proprietors of Royal  
“ Authority.”

Lord BOLINGBROKE.

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D U B L I N:

Printed by D. GRAISBERRY, No. 10, Back-Lane.

M.DCC.LXXXIV.



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T O T H E  
V O L U N T E E R S.

**I**N addressing you I speak to the people of Ireland, to all the virtue, spirit, strength, and independence in the nation. The ties which unite, and the principles that actuate you, embrace and animate the whole community. Whatsoever of patriotism, whatsoever of genius, whatsoever of experience and ability this kingdom could produce, is leagued with you; and every lover of his country, every honest Irishman, is in act or sentiment a Volunteer.

The unexampled propriety of your conduct through a long series of important transactions, is a testimony of the wisdom that has hitherto directed you, and a flattering earnest of your future exertions. Among those counsels which the occasion has called forth from abler advocates, in-  
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dulge the speculations of an ~~an~~ obscure man, whose zeal, at least in the common cause, is equal to that of its most eminent supporters.

The question of Reform, a second time contemptuously rejected in the House of Commons, reverts once more to yourselves, among whom it has been so fully and repeatedly examined, that ingenuity might scarce find an argument, whether to aid or overturn it, that has not already been applied and exhausted; but ingenuity is useless where plain sense can determine; the most obvious reasons are generally the best, and if they are sufficient, you will not be disgusted by any repetitions which contend for an object so dear to this country, and so interesting to humanity, as the attainment of a Free Constitution.

The question seems reducible to two plain propositions—First, the expediency of the measure, and secondly, the right and competency of the people to effect it.

The first will also involve an enquiry into the force and authority of that Assembly who have ventured to oppose it.

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With regard to the expediency of a Legislative Reform, I shall adopt the principle on which it is denied, and willingly admit, that the frame of our Government derived from Great Britain is the happiest the policy of man has yet devised; but as no earthly institution can be originally perfect, the best is liable to decay, and when we begin to feel those ills which usually result from the most odious establishments; when measures of general utility are uniformly resisted by our Rulers, and those alone of public execration promoted, it is reasonable to conclude, that our applauded system is perverted, that practice has been warped from theory, and that while a specious appearance is delusively preserved, the spirit, health, and energy of the Constitution are destroyed. Our Legislature comprises three distinct conditions, the Regal, the Aristocratick, and the popular, all united ultimately, but each originating and subsisting independently of the rest. The King holds by birth the first estate, the Lords are the hereditary guardians of the middle power, and the Commons are peculiarly appointed

by the people. It might be seasonable here to contemplate severally these three authorities, and to describe the due extent and exercise of each; nor would evidence be wanting from such investigation, to shew that gross irregularity and abuse subsist in all the departments; but since the complaint rests chiefly with the democratic order, I shall confine myself to that distinction. The acknowledged excellence of our political arrangement has been held forth as a plea to supercede Reform, and I would ask, what is the House of Commons upon the scale of the Constitution? Recurrence to chosen periods of remote story were equally fruitless and unnecessary. Ignorance may be misled, and \* learn-

\* An ingenious and able Pleader, who seemed to entertain a thorough contempt for the knowledge of his Auditors in the House of Commons, contending against that part of the Reform Bill which respected the qualification of Electors, thought proper to conduct us for an æra of perfection in the Constitution to the Act of Disfranchisement passed in the miserable reign of Henry the Sixth, a period in which the Constitution was so far from being established, and the Rights of Election so little understood, or so utterly disregarded, that an Act of Parliament in that reign declared, "That all such Knights of any County, as were returned [by virtue of the King's Letters, without any other Election, should be valid; and that no Sheriff for returning them should incur the penalty of the statute of Henry the Fourth."

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ing debased by artful retrospect and inference, but through the whole series of the British annals, from the first Edward to the date of the Stewarts, I challenge any man to mark an æra whereat he should not blush to exhibit the House of Commons as a pattern for imitation. If we are to look back for example we must contract our view to the Revolution, and the history subsequent, yet even there the most improved and dignified portion of our records, it would be difficult to find a page where truth could set her finger and declare—Here was a Parliament a model for posterity;—but what precedent will not furnish plain reason can supply. This celebrated system is not the primitive construction of any age, nor the device of any wisdom; the complicated fabric has been reared by a happy concurrence of fortuitous incidents, operating with time and the liberal genius of the people; let us not then be cheated into reverence for the fabled antiquity of any dangerous mode, nor deterred by the bugbear innovation from applying a wholesome remedy to the diseases of the state.

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Every distinguished advance by which our government attained its latter eminence was called successively an innovation——

The famous Charter of our Liberties was an innovation upon Kingly Prerogative; the Patent Establishment of Corporations, which opened the door to Popular Independence, was an innovation on the power of the Nobles; the introduction of the purest Religion was also innovation; the expulsion and disgrace of an antient Royal Family, and the advancement of a stranger to the Throne, was a bold and unexampled innovation; nay, the very House of Commons, that tumid Herald of its own importance, was itself an innovation on the former Government.—Omitting then a vain appeal to undecisive Journals, and free from prejudice, I speak to the plain discernment of every man, and ask, What the House of Commons is on the principle of the present Constitution? Is it not an assembly of persons nominated by the people to represent them in the Great Council of the Nation, there to express the public mind, and to act as the people themselves would act? Is it not an abstract merely  
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from the community, which at large would be too numerous for effective deliberation.

—If such be the office and situation of the Commons, they must in reason be elected by the full unwarped consent of the people, whose welfare they profess to seek, whose rights they are bound to defend, and for whose sake alone they have political existence.—But instead of this equitable procedure, should it be found, that places in the National Assembly are claimed like property, and bartered or retained by individuals as suits their avarice and ambition.—Did it appear, that of three hundred men, who hold in confidence the dearest interests of the people, above two hundred standing on personal importance, disclaim all duty to the public, and act in open disregard of their Constituents, is there <sup>re</sup> a wretch so blindly profligate, or one so preposterously audacious, as to deny that such Representation calls loudly for Reform? Whether Parliament in Ireland subsists on any better footing will be seen by the following remarks:—Three hundred Members compose our House of Commons, eighty-eight whereof represent the

the Counties, Cities, and respectable Towns, the rest are furnished by the Boroughs.—These Boroughs, according to the late circumstantial accounts of them, are for the most part miserably poor and depopulated, often consisting of no more than five or six Burgeffes, and a Magistrate utterly dependent on the Landlord.—In some places there is but one, in others only two or three, and in many not a single resident Elector; upon the whole it is clear, that one hundred and six Boroughs obtrude into the National Council two hundred and twelve Members, appointed almost absolutely by about ninety despotic leaders, who blush not at exposing the iniquitous privilege to an open sale.—Here then is a Parliament in which eighty-eight persons may be said to represent the people, while two hundred and twelve are only Members for themselves or their respective patrons.—To support this notable Representation three arguments are tried—First, its antiquity, secondly, the injustice of taking from Borough-holders what they derive by birth, or have obtained by purchase; and lastly, the

the benefit arising to the State from the hopeful abilities of humble Patriots, who could not aspire to Senatorial Place by means of an open election. With regard to the first, Antiquity is a word of sacred use and mystick implication.—It prevails like Religion, and sanctifies contradictions.—One object is preferred on account of its Antiquity, another by reason of its Antiquity is disapproved.—The Boroughs are to be preserved, as innovation is pernicious, and lengthened Parliaments must be maintained, as innovation has been salutary.—But what is the real Antiquity of the Boroughs? The enquiry may be fatal to the cause which calls it forth.—

In that early stage of English politics, when towards restraining the enormous pretensions of the Barons, who were grown no less dangerous to regal authority, than insolent and oppressive to the people, the King conceived the policy of soothing his inferior subjects, Boroughs or Corporations were instituted through the land, endowed by the Crown with immunities and privileges, protective against the encroachments of the haughty Nobility.—These  
Boroughs

Boroughs encreas<sup>ing</sup> rapidly in wealth and estimation became in little time of such account, that whenever the King had any matter of weight to propose, he held it prudent to consult with them, and gained a sanction from their concurrence. For this purpose Edward the First, in addition to the Knights, called up two Deputies from every Borough, before whom he explained his intentions, and demanded their support. This was the origin of Borough Parliaments, and the true foundation of the House of Commons—But how does it apply to the present condition of Irish Boroughs, unless by inverse comparison.—In England the Boroughs furnished Deputies, because the Boroughs there composed a material part of the Community; because they had property, and were able to defend it; because they were qualified to check the arrogance of an overgrown Aristocracy; and because, in the noble expression of the Monarch who resorted to them,—“ It is a most equitable rule, that what concerns all should be approved by all, and that common dangers be repelled by united exertions.”

tions."—The Boroughs in England were rich and populous, in Ireland they are poor and nearly uninhabited ; in England they had an interest in the Common Wealth, in Ireland they have no attachment beyond the limits of a farm ; there they could reduce the inordinate power of the Nobles, here they serve only to augment it. The Representative Office in the beginning was imposed as a duty, the expence whereof was defrayed by the Constituents, with us it is an object of ruinous ambition, for which the wretched Voters are suborned and the Country betrayed.—Antiquity thus, instead of justifying the state of our Boroughs, is an illustration of their absurdity.—The hardship of wresting Boroughs from the possessors comes next to be considered :—This possession or property, as it has been impudently called, is an absolute flagrant usurpation, and as such ought to be unconditionally surrendered, since no political privilege can fairly exist which does not contribute to the general advantage.—But if justice for the sake of good humour, will temporize and yield a compensation, let

let the usurpers, agreeable to the sentiment of a distinguished Senator, " be paid in Money and not in Constitution." On the last point, the benefit arising to the State from private ingress to Parliament, and the judicious exercise of Borough Patronage, much emphasis is laid, and however ridiculously the argument appeared in the blundering eloquence which ushered it to the House of Commons, the names of some who have advanced to public life through that medium, must prompt us to regard it with a transient respect, and for a moment suspend its condemnation ; yet, though integrity and talents might gain their place through Borough-negotiation, bad men and fools can find admittance by the same road.—If a prostitute Borough gave birth to Lord Chatham, it also introduced Lord North ; and without any irreverence to the memory of the former, it must be allowed, that the utmost good of his illustrious actions, has been more than counterpoised by the calamitous misdoing of the latter.—But besides that, the objects of depraved ambition are fatally of readier attainment than those which incite

cite an honourable mind, and that the efforts of virtue, when opposed, even in an equal scale, to the influence of corruption, will contend at a natural disadvantage; what is the number of those exemplary persons, on whose exclusive credit the Borough system is reduced to hang? or what proportion bear they to the rest, who are left without the colour of defence?

The contumelious treatment of the motion for Reform, the fate of the Protecting Duty Bill, the outrageous attack upon the Liberty of Printing, the servile catalogue of the majority in Parliament, on every national proposition, will at once be an answer to this question, and declare, without a comment, the necessity of Reforming the Borough Representation. It is advanced, that open elections are not effectual, and that counties and cities, as well as boroughs, have returned bad members. The remark is certainly a just reflection on human infirmity, but has no other use, unless as it may lead us to contemplate borough enormity in a farther stage, where a monstrous traffic is maintained, of one illicit influence for another, and borough seats  
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are pawned for county support.\* Open election is required, not as an infallible mode, but because it is the best we know, because the judgment of an hundred persons is more likely to be right, than the opinion of but one, and because it is an undisputed truth, that what the many have an interest in, ought not to be appropriated to the few. But it is not sufficient that Representatives be fairly chosen, we must likewise have a care that they perform their duty: Representation, which is a trust, is ever in its nature responsible, and the Representation of a Community, which is the most important of all Trusts, should be called to account as frequently as is compatible with the efficient discharge of its functions. A Parliament of seven or

\* One man secure of a place among the Boroughs, but ambitious to sit for a County, looks out for a person who has an interest in that County, but who prefers a secure, though humble return, for a Borough, to the precarious event of a contested and expensive election---an exchange is immediately negotiated, of the inferior certainty for the higher probability; and thus is a stranger, not only placed in the Borough, but a person, perhaps unknown to the Constituents, is also imposed upon the County.

eight years continuance, is little better than one for life, since all the ends of corruption may be as fully answered in eight years as in fifty. The argument which would defend the prostitution of Boroughs, by remarking the depravity of Knights of the Shire, might in this place be applicable, and superadd a motive for more frequent elections, and when we consider the effrontery wherewith the Representatives of some great counties, presuming on the permanency of their seat, withstood on a late occasion the unanimous desire of their constituents, we must immediately perceive the folly of prolonging so dangerous an authority. Parliaments, I say, ought not only to be constitutionally formed, their duration likewise should be constitutionally, that is, rationally limited; vice, ignorance and folly, have been mistaken for virtue, learning and discretion, nay, where those qualities are truly found, they cannot always be proof against the unwearied assaults of seduction; and a Parliament commencing on the purest plan, might in time be wrought to embrace the most abandoned; allurements we know have been held

held out, and should it be contended that Representatives are chaste, at least it will not be denied they are suspected, and that is enough at present. If the public stewards have *power* to injure the public estate, the Constitution must restrain that power—the sottish and detestable doctrine (could it at all obtain) which says, that confidence once placed, or power committed on such confidence, is not to be withdrawn, might farther enforce the necessity limiting to the shortest space, the term of Representation.

Those who profess to venerate original forms, must subscribe to shorter Parliaments, or renounce their pretended devotion. Parliaments in England were always annual, until the time of William and Mary, and whatever may appear to recommend triennial meetings, the act which introduced them was as flagrant a violation of the Constitution as could be perpetrated: the success of the first infringement led naturally to a second, and Parliament, in a following reign, enlarged their usurpation to seven years; this was but one step short of the consummate ordinance,

dinance, which, in Ireland, extended the date of representation to the King's life, and thereby dissipated in an instant, the very shadow of popular significance. If precedent therefore were needful, in aid of common sense, our Parliament, at least, was warranted to enter upon this part of the Reform. For though example can never consecrate injustice, it will always facilitate the accomplishment of right, and if the Legislature was qualified to strip from the public their precious franchise of election, no one would question their sufficiency to restore it.

That Parliament was equally empowered to change the Representation I cannot admit; it is sufficient, at present, that in every Point of View, whether we resort to Maxims of antient Times, or stand upon the simple Ground of Equity and Reason, a Reform in the House of Commons, both with regard to Election and Duration, is clearly and positively necessary.

If the EXPEDIENCY of a Reform is granted, the consequent proposition will be readily agreed to, namely, **THE RIGHT AND COMPETENCY OF THE PEOPLE TO EFFECT IT.** Nothing,  
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indeed, but the abandoned audacity of some men, contending for absurd ill, and of others the torpid assent such tenets have received, could superinduce a vindication of that manifest conclusion. As no truth however is so hard to be explained, as that which is self-evident, I may possibly be led to deviate a little, in a resort to collateral evidence, and negative position. The aim of civil government, confessedly, is public good, the disposition of it therefore must ever be subject to the controul of the people\*, by whose authority at first it was framed, and on whose acquiescence ultimately it relies for support. The forms of equitable dominion are not imposed, but tolerated, they possess no inherent abstract, virtue or validity, and are only acknowledged, because they are approved—peculiar modes of rule and privileges, annexed to legislative office, are merely artificial, and being instituted solely for the general benefit, are sacred no longer than while they operate to that end. The supreme Government of a country not enslaved, is

\* The Legislative being only a *fiduciary* power, to act for certain ends, there always remains in the People a *supreme* Power to remove or alter the Legislative. LOCKE.

by no means arbitrary, there are many exertions of power beyond the lawful capacity of our united Legislature; it cannot overturn a single principle of equity or right reason, nor can it alter, upon any pretext, in the minutest degree, its own particular structure. The enemies of Reform have rendered here, an involuntary, yet important confession. Human wisdom is unable to compact a scheme of infallible policy, the best is barely a machine, incapable of acting beyond determined limits, and where the plan is defective, that power only, which framed it, can supply the remedy, for could it belong to the King, Lords and Commons, to *amend* the Constitution, what is there to restrict them from corrupting it? if they are privileged to alter, they have the means to destroy; if they can disfranchise one Borough, they may reduce the whole; nay, if they are able to disqualify a single elector, they might extend the proscription to the kingdom at large, and make a perpetual despotism by act of Parliament. Let no man say, that such an act can never be, such acts have been, and will again, unless the Constitution is careful to prevent them.

But the Legislature, which in the hands that are appointed to conduct it is strictly a trust, is with the Public a property, and property is always at the disposal of the owner. Nevertheless, though the native authority of the People, with respect to modes of jurisprudence, is certainly arbitrary, and supercedes at once all the subordinate factitious powers, even their supreme ordination becomes in time amenable to equity and nature. Communities, like the members who compose them, are liable to error and misconduct, they have their childhood, their maturity, and their decay, their days of ignorance, and periods of illumination. An ignorant age may misconceive their rights, a degenerate one might disregard them; yet barbarism and profligacy combined, will not extinguish what is for ever springing forth, the gift of Providence to mankind, with their being: a savage or corrupted people, might join with tyranny and enslave themselves, but they cannot impose bondage on their children; the public weal is a positive, perpetual right, descending to all posterity. The officers of the state, in every department, are servants

vants, at the pleasure of the people; but the people whom we may term the political landlords, are themselves only tenants for life—they can impoverish the estate, but must not alienate it; they may squander the produce, but cannot entail the growth, 'tis of political as of private tenure; a man may sell, he may sequester, he may waste, he may destroy his personal possessions; but the real hereditary freehold, with all its rights, distinctions and immunities, must descend unimpaired to his successor. We have been told, that the People are not qualified to judge of a political case, that their interference in behalf of Reform, is a dangerous innovation, and that they are usurping the office and insulting the dignity of Parliament. In answer to all this I must repeat, that the People are undoubtedly the masters of their own institutions, even were the aggregate knowledge and virtue of the nation engrossed by the House of Commons—their exercise therefore, of an acknowledged right, cannot with any propriety be called an innovation—neither is their interference dangerous; the mass of the People will never be

be moved, but on some great and worthy occasion; tranquillity is dear to Citizens, the comforts of repose are held so estimable, that many undue concessions will be yielded to preserve it, and Irishmen have hugged it at a bitter price. The accustomed forms, even of a bad Legislature, obtain in the minds of men a natural respect. Individuals will revere what the Public ordain, but whenever the body of the nation is roused to disaffection, the vices of the Constitution are no longer sanctified; when the rights, which Freemen prize above existence, become a question between the Servants of the State and the Community at large, the delegated power of the Legislature is superseded, and the robe of veneration wherewith it was invested plucked away. Yet the People are not advancing upon the province of the Legislature, for Parliament, in the present instance, has declared its own incompetency. The last objection indeed cannot be denied; the dignity of the House of Commons must inevitably be impaired, when absurdly thrust forward to cope with the dignity of the People, whereof it is no more than

a feeble emanation. Let us direct our view once more to the House of Commons, and consider for a moment how they stand—they are called the Representatives of the People, on which distinction only they subsist; but if the People say they are not represented, it is nonsense for any one to contend that they are—the conduct of that House, with respect to the petitions with which they were of late so unworthily exalted, is a record of their own condemnation—for what have they done? a measure decided in the public mind, with unprecedented unity, and recommended to them by the Constituents, with an ardour proportioned to its importance is refused—this refusal of itself, disqualifies them; the People assert they are not truly represented, and the false Representatives demonstrate the assertion; for it is a necessary property of Representation, the very meaning of the word, to be subservient, and when the Representative denies the obligation, or acts in contradiction to it, he changes his quality, and loses his occupation. Thus the House of Commons have virtually dissolved

solved themselves, and removed from the work of Reform, by their own act, whatever shadow of obstruction they might be said to exhibit against the agency of the People.

To conclude, we behold in the Constitution acknowledged and convicted evils, which the Legislature avowedly is unable to correct—What then remains? because one scheme of instrumental policy is found inadequate to its design, shall the Public-weal be sacrificed? Must the rights of a whole kingdom, and the probable happiness of generations yet unborn be forfeited, because our fathers, honest themselves, and not suspecting treachery, left the door of corruption in the Commonwealth unbarred? The means should be abandoned which attain not to their end, and reverence for ancestors were poorly testified in adhering to the Forms, while we relinquished the spirit of their institutions.—But I have dwelt too long upon an obvious truth; the discernment of the Irish Nation is not so far behind their zeal as to require this diffuse exposition—You know what is due to you and will exact it; I shall only add a few words more—

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Of all the features which mark the Irish Character at this day, the most distinguishing is Moderation ; and though it may be the best, as it certainly is the rarest quality in a popular confederacy, even that, like every other virtue, may be cherished to excess—it has already betrayed you into one egregious mistake——too delicately anxious of concord, you petitioned where you ought to command, and begged from your servants what was not theirs to bestow.—Fortunately for you, the insolence of those servants took lead of their incapacity, and in the height of *presumption*, they avoided an act, which might have stood a fatal precedent of the most atrocious treason.—You are now turned back to the ground whereon you should at first have rested, but you resume the post with advantage, with recruited strength, and judgment ripened by experience.—The game of your Mock-Parliament is shortly to be renewed, when, struck with the danger of their situation, they may probably introduce some flattering measures to delude the vulgar.—Another Equalising-Duty Bill, with motives as dishonest as those which accompanied the

the former, will perhaps be *seriously* proposed and carried.—But beware of any thing which can tend to re-establish the pernicious authority of that Assembly—Let it still be impressed on your mind, that a Parliament, execrated and disclaimed by the people, is no less unqualified to serve you than impotent to do you harm, and you must be as determined to reject their favours as to resist their oppression.

The step that lies before you now is an address to the King, requiring him first to dissolve, in *Form*, a Parliament, which in substance is already defunct; and next to assist you in adjusting a True Representation.—This is by no means a necessary expedient, but being easy, it is perhaps a wise one—The question is not a contest between parties—The people here are independently the principal at whose pleasure, not only the House of Commons, but the whole fabrick of the Legislature, is at all times dissoluble; and as the mode of an address is merely a *Compliment* to the Crown, and the object of it the *People* exclusively, the least attention to the Lords were superfluous.—

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If it bore not too much the appearance of vanity, I would suppose that your sentiments were delivered to the King in terms like these :

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“ WHATEVER might have been the prejudice of a Royal Education, or the early influence of an insidious Court, we trust that your own experience, as well as the general history of your Predecessors, has endued you with the knowledge of your real condition, and prepared you to meet this Address with becoming temper.—The foundation of the Government whereof you are placed in the supreme seat is purely Popular, and the order of its superstructure only adopted as being judged the most commodious for the general welfare.—The power by which you rule is no divine or self-existent right, but a commission in trust from the People, and all the Prerogatives of Regal Office, not one of which was ever granted for the peculiar emolument of the Magistrate, must be exercised strictly for the public good

good \*; among the privileges wherewith for that end you are invested, is the power of calling together and dissolving Parliaments, but this, like every other assumption of Royalty, is only indulged for temporary expedience.—It is in the Crown a plant of artificial growth, a cion lopped without injury from the eternal trunk which roots in the broad Community, and should it wither on an alien stock, or bring forth spurious fruit, the hand that grafted it can pluck it forth.—The House of Commons, which by the Constitution that upholds your dignity, should be the genuine offspring of the People, conforming to their interests, possessed of their confidence, and masters of their strength, is in Ireland, a partial Aristocratical Imposture, disavowed and reprobated by the Universal Kingdom, and being destitute now of public support, can no longer maintain its station in the Legislature, or give energy to your Royal Authority.—We therefore call upon you, not in the feeble tone of supplicating dif-

\* Prerogative is nothing but the power of doing public good without a Rule.

LOCKE.

fidence,

fidence, but with the open voice of Freemen speaking to a Patriot King; of men resolved to obtain those rights, which are no less a Prince's glory than the boast of a nation, and demand the dissolution of this opprobrious Senate.—But the evil we seek to remove is not confined within the walls of Parliament, it extends to some dangerous principles in the received establishment of the House of Commons, and pervades the whole system of Election.—A dissolution will intermit, but not cure the distemper; and we must further require your assistance, in constructing finally an adequate, efficient, and constitutional Representation.—We shall not afflict you, by renewing in your Royal Breast the memory of those disasters with which you were long beset, by fatal adherence to an unpopular Parliament; we perceive with gladness the delusion is passed—You find that Representatives may differ from Constituents, and you know where to fix the preference.—One fourth of the people on a late occasion in England exclaimed against the House of Commons, and you prudently

prudently dissolved a Parliament which had lost the confidence of a *Quarter* of the nation ; you are called upon now to exert the same Prerogative in Ireland, and we have an earnest in your wisdom, as well as justice, that you will not despise the Requisition of a *Whole* Kingdom."

Such an Address coming from authority like yours, and uttered in your own expression, will have its weight ; the King must yield compliance.—Were it possible his gracious disposition could be so abused ; should he by any hellish instigation so far forget the duty of his place as to resist your equitable claims, and stand in frantick opposition to the united Public, I need not point out the measures you must take, they are suggested in the general tendency of this discourse, they are the ready dictates of every noble spirit in the Nation, they are manifested in your armed Bands, they are proclaimed by Nature and enjoined by God.

ANDREW DORIA.